Optimal Incentives on Multiple Prosocial Activities when Reputation Matters*
研究当个人通过参与多项亲社会活动来传递合作意愿信号时，如何设计货币补贴以最大化社会福利，发现最优补贴取决于每项活动带来的声誉收益。
Abstract In this paper, we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially beneficial but costly activities in order to convey information about their willingness to cooperate with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary compensations in any one of them affects the relative costs of undertaking each activity and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We find the subsidies that maximize social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the effects on optimal subsidies of changes in their determinants.