Reputation, Bailouts, and Interest Rate Spread Dynamics
研究了利率利差动态与政府救助决策的联合理论，解释了危机初期政府拒绝救助、后期却提供救助的现象，以及利差呈驼峰形和传染效应。
We propose a joint theory for interest rate dynamics and bailout decisions. Interest rate spreads are driven by time-varying fundamentals and expectations of future bailouts. Private agents are uncertain about the government's willingness to bail out and learn by observing its actions. The model provides an explanation for why we observe governments initially refusing to bail out borrowers at the beginning of a crisis even if they eventually end up providing a bailout after the crisis aggravates. The typical equilibrium outcome displays hump-shaped spreads and contagion as was the case in the US financial and European debt crises.