Strategic Ignorance in Sequential Procurement
研究了买方在采购互补品时，应选择知情还是不知情自己的私人估值，以及知情时如何安排顺序，发现知情买方会优先接触高价值卖方以减少后续要挟，但知情顺序可能因卖方解读而损害买方，因此买方可能承诺无知，但无知在时间上不一致，却能增加交易量。
Should a buyer approach sellers of complementary goods informed or uninformed of her private valuations, and if informed, in which sequence? In this paper, we show that an informed buyer would start with the high-value seller to minimize future holdup. Informed (or careful) sequencing may, however, hurt the buyer as sellers “read” into it. The buyer may, therefore, commit to ignorance, perhaps, by overloading herself with unrelated tasks, delegating the sequencing decision, or letting sellers self-schedule. Absent such commitment, we show that ignorance is not time-consistent for the buyer, but it increases trade. Evidence on land assembly supports our findings.