Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority
研究了在电影发行商与放映商之间，正式合同支持的关系合同如何实现比单独使用正式或关系合同更好的适应决策，并利用事后重新谈判的数据验证了发行商对放映商适应行为的奖励机制。
We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contracts may achieve relational adaptation that improves on adaptation decisions achieved by formal or relational contracts alone. Our empirics consider revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and an exhibitor. The exhibitor has discretion about whether and when to show a movie, and the parties frequently renegotiate formal contracts after a movie has finished its run. We document that such ex post renegotiation is consistent with the distributor rewarding the exhibitor for adaptation decisions that improve their joint payoffs. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.