Pharmaceutical opioid marketing and physician prescribing behavior
研究利用2014-2017年Medicare Part D和Open Payments数据，发现制药公司对医生的营销活动（次数和金额）会增加医生开具专利阿片类药物的处方，且安全型阿片类药物营销会意外地促进非安全型仿制药处方，可能与保险覆盖政策有关。
Physicians' relationships with the pharmaceutical industry have recently come under public scrutiny, particularly in the context of opioid drug prescribing. This study examines the effect of doctor-industry marketing interactions on subsequent prescribing patterns of opioids using linked Medicare Part D and Open Payments data for the years 2014-2017. Results indicate that both the number and the dollar-value of marketing visits increase physicians' patented opioid claims. Furthermore, direct-to-physician marketing of safer abuse-deterrent formulations of opioids is the primary driver of positive and persistent spillovers on the prescribing of less safe generic opioids - a result that we show appears to be driven by insurance coverage policies. These findings suggest that pharmaceutical marketing efforts may have unintended public health implications.