Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception
提出一种新实验方法（激励性简历评分），让雇主评估假设简历并与真实求职者匹配，既保持激励又避免欺骗，同时区分雇主对候选人的偏好和对其接受工作可能性的信念。
We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.