Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems
研究了动态学校选择问题中，学生能否操纵逐期延迟接受机制，发现当学校优先级受常见限制时操纵随参与者增多而消失，否则即使在大经济体中操纵仍可能发生，并通过新算法验证了有限大经济中的操纵可能性。
In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools’ priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.