On the Optimality of Financial Repression
研究了政府何时应强制银行持有国债（金融压制）。有承诺时从不优化，因挤占银行投资；无承诺时，战时等需大量发债时优化，因能提高债务可信度，违约成本高。
When is financial repression—namely, policies that force banks to hold government debt—optimal? With commitment, such policies are never optimal because they crowd out banks’ productive investments. Without commitment, they are optimal when governments need to issue unusually large amounts of debt, such as during wartime. In such times, repression allows governments to credibly issue more debt. Repression increases credibility because when banks hold government debt, defaults dilute net worth, reduce investment, and are thus costly ex post. Forcing banks to hold debt endogenously increases these ex post costs but has ex ante costs because doing so crowds out investments.