Arms Races and Conflict: Experimental Evidence
通过实验室游戏模拟军备竞赛，发现武器库存不可观察时威慑增强，权力平衡有效维持和平，互利贸易降低对抗风险但不必然减少军备竞赛。
Abstract We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player, which almost totally eliminates the victim's earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike. Weapons can serve as a means of deterrence. In four treatments, we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace, and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races.