When Do Qualitative Risk Disclosures Backfire? The Effects of a Mismatch in Hedge Disclosure Formats on Investors' Judgments
研究发现，当对冲工具披露为定量而风险项目披露为定性时，格式不匹配导致投资者忽视对冲关系，从而影响风险评估和投资判断；而使用定性去偏工具可缓解此效应。
ABSTRACT Disclosure standards mandate the quantitative disclosure of hedging‐instrument‐related risks but not the disclosure of hedged‐item‐related risks. We examine how a match (mismatch) in formats, caused by making quantitative (qualitative) hedged item disclosures alongside quantitative hedging instrument disclosures, affects investors' integration of information from these two related disclosures. Our first experiment varies the hedged item disclosure format (quantitative or qualitative) and the portion of risk hedged (small or large). We find that when disclosure formats are mismatched, the less comparable nature of the two disclosures caused investors to neglect the offsetting relationship when assessing net risks. As a result, risk and investment judgments were influenced by the more prominent quantitative hedging instrument disclosures. Our second experiment finds that the use of a qualitative debiaser that clarifies the relationship between the two disclosures led to the integration of information and mitigated this effect.