Voluntary Disclosures When There Is an Option to Delay Disclosure
研究了当经理人可以选择延迟披露时，什么激励他们立即披露信息，发现当前公共新闻利好时经理人更倾向于立即披露，这解释了为何当前盈余高时经理人更可能提供盈余预测。
ABSTRACT What incentives drive managers to disclose immediately when they have an option to delay disclosures? I examine this question in a two‐period setting in which public news that is positively correlated with firm value arrives periodically. I show that, when the manager's likelihood of receiving information is independent of the public news, an informed manager is more likely to disclose immediately when the public news is good. This happens even as the disclosure threshold itself increases in the public news. My model provides a potential explanation for why managers have a higher propensity to provide earnings forecasts when current earnings are high. I also show that, even when disclosures are credible, the average price reaction to a voluntary disclosure is (i) decreasing in the magnitude of the public news and (ii) lower when the manager is more myopic. These results have potential implications for studies that use stock returns to measure the news contained in management disclosures.