Governance: The Next Frontier for Research on Multinational Firms
指出公司治理是跨国公司研究的新前沿，通过对比内部化理论与代理理论两种视角，探讨治理机制如何影响跨国公司的组织与成长，对国际商务学者有重要参考价值。
The much heralded research of Buckley and Casson (1976) championed the march of the analysis of multinational firms towards mainstream theorizing on the advantages of hierarchy, of various sorts, for the expansion of firms across international borders. The work of Buckley and Casson (1976) was timely in at least two regards. It was conceived and published at a time when multinational firms were reemerging as substantial and legitimate forms of organization. It was written when parallel, albeit not identical, theorizing on firm boundaries (Williamson, 1975) and the growth and scope of multinational firms (Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981) was also emerging into mainstream conceptions of strategy and organization. Since its publication, the research of Buckley and Casson (1976) has been at the root of 35 years of theorizing on, and empirical examinations of, multinational firms, be it the path of internationalization (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007), the performance consequences of internationalization (Lu and Beamish, 2004), or the modality of internationalization (Lu, 2002). Indeed, aside from the omnipotence of Dunning's (1993) writings to the trajectory of research on multinational firms, it would be difficult to find a more influential work. Yet, influence does not equate to a comprehensive conception or an omnipresence in research on international business and multinational firms. Buckley and Casson's (1976) research has its limitations, given its focus on the organization and modes of international expansion for multinational firms. It is one of these limitations, namely the linkage between a firm's ownership structure and its international strategy, that inspired the development of this Point–Counterpoint on the relationship between corporate governance of multinational firms and their organization and growth. Research on multinational firms typically precedes, at least on a phenomenological basis, comparable research on the management and organization of firms as situated in the economics, finance, and strategy literatures. This precedence extends from the existence of multinational firms as frontier organizations that grapple with new trials in management, organization, and strategy that come from competing in diverse and distanced settings. Interestingly, however, corporate governance research has been at the periphery of research on multinational firms, while being at the heart of economics, finance, and strategy research for a number of decades (Baker et al., 1988; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Only since the onset of the 2000s, as developed country multinational firms have moved into emerging markets, and as emerging market firms have become multinational firms in their own right (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005), have researchers focused on international business and multinational enterprise started to consider issues of corporate governance. One of the reasons for this initiation of research, and a consequent embedded set of opportunities, is the tremendous range of governance forms and governance issues found in multinational firms and emerging economy firms. These issues range from principal–principal conflict in family-owned firms with minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008), to the organization of business groups (Yiu et al., 2007), to the structures of various forms of alliances in new forms of internationalization (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010), and to the predominance of state ownership alongside the challenge of transition in ownership and governance structures (Delios et al., 2006). Indeed, similar to the two compelling forces – theory and phenomenon – that drove the creation of Buckley and Casson's (1976) research, in 2011, we have two similar forces motivating this Point–Counterpoint. Theory and conceptions of corporate governance are ripe to be applied to multinational firms; while the variety of governance structures to be examined in international markets is mushrooming. Given this conceptual and phenomenological backdrop, we invited scholars grounded in the internationalization theory paradigm and scholars from a mainstream agency theory perspective on governance to deliberate on theory and conceptions of governance and multinational enterprise. The conversation in this Point–Counterpoint hinges on the utility bridging of internationalization theory concepts to traditional corporate governance issues for multinational firms; as compared to the insights that can be gained by bridging standard agency theory governance concepts to the richness of ownership and corporate forms found among multinational firms in the global arena. Buckley and Strange (2011) open the conversation by establishing a clear position in the internalization theory paradigm, in which they identify internalization theory as being fundamentally a theory about multinational firms as an efficient governance mechanism for international transactions. Buckley and Strange develop their arguments by first differentiating between external transaction costs and internal transaction costs. External transaction costs relate to the whether and how of the use of the multinational firm as a governance mechanism for transactions. Meanwhile, internal transaction costs are linked to the governance and organization of activities in the multinational firm. The latter, internal transaction costs, connects directly to their ideas on the influence of governance on multinational firms. Buckley and Strange remain true to fundamental tenets of internalization theory, as they explore how the multinational firm exists as a mix of market and hierarchy for firm growth. They consider the imperfections in the multinational firm governance structure as stemming from incomplete information, imperfect coordination, and non-aligned motivations. Imperfections in these dimensions lead to challenges of governance in multinational firms, which is also the conceptual foundation for the arguments of Buckley and Strange. Filatotchev and Wright (2011) post an appreciably different view on governance. Rather than looking at the mechanisms of internal governance for multinational firms, as founded in various attributes of the exchange and the organization, Filatotchev and Wright situate their arguments firmly in agency theory applications to organizational issues prevalent in multinational firms, such as the internationalization process, relationships between organizational sub-units in the multinational firm, and the governance of sub-units and supra-organizational units, like business groups. Filatotchev and Wright essentially view the multinational firm as a form of organizational laboratory in which various forms of organizational governance experiments are taking place. In this sense, multinational firms represent the frontier of challenges in new and innovative organization forms and corporate governance modalities against which standard agency theory concepts can be applied, tested, and hopefully extended. As such, Filatotchev and Wright outline a research agenda in which they identify how governance mechanisms and sub-mechanisms can be applied to governance challenges that are endemic to all organizations, but fundamentally pronounced in multinational firms. The differences in the form and thrust of argumentation are sizeable, but Buckley and Strange (2011) and Filatotchev and Wright (2011) develop a number of compelling and detailed arguments in their respective Point and Counterpoint, which make for gripping reading, either jointly or as independent contributions. Yet, we think the debate unfolds most dramatically when the ideas in the two papers are pitched against one another. By juxtaposing the two sides of the debate in the journal, we hope not only to crystallize current thinking on the issue of governance and multinational enterprise, but also to catalyse a new generation of research on multinational firms, as founded on expanded conceptions of the core influences on the growth, organization, and performance of these ever-important corporate forms.