Competition, Innovation and the Use of Innovations
利用英国1950年代末引入卡特尔立法的自然实验，比较受影响的合谋行业与未受影响的竞争行业，发现竞争加剧短期内减少创新产出但长期无显著影响，而创新使用在短期和长期均增加。
I examine the effect of competition on the production and use of innovations using evidence from a natural experiment of policy reform, the introduction of cartel legislation in the U.K. in the late 1950’s. I compare manufacturing industries which had been collusive and were therefore affected by the policy with those that had been competitive and were not affected. The intensification of competition following the abolition of cartels caused a short‐run decrease in innovations produced , but had no significant effect in the long run. In contrast, innovations used increased both in the short run and in the long run.