贝叶斯说服与信息设计

Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design

Annual Review of Economics · 2019
被引 413 · 同刊同年前 9%
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

综述了在完全理性下,通过设计信息(如粗粒度成绩、噪声交通信息、部分银行偿付能力信息)来改善社会或私人结果的文献,回答了最优信息揭示的问题。

Abstract

A school may improve its students’ job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A social planner might raise everyone's welfare by providing only partial information about solvency of banks. All of this can happen even when everyone is fully rational and understands the data-generating process. Each of these examples raises questions of what is the (socially or privately) optimal information that should be revealed. In this article, I review the literature that answers such questions.

贝叶斯劝说信息设计最优信息揭示