Contractual Managerial Incentives with Stock Price Feedback
研究了金融市场摩擦如何影响管理层薪酬，发现市场摩擦减少时股价信息含量提高，从而降低绩效薪酬强度，并通过随机实验验证了这一效应。
We study the effect of financial market frictions on managerial compensation. We embed a market microstructure model into an otherwise standard contracting framework, and analyze optimal pay-for-performance when managers use information they learn from the market in their investment decisions. In a less frictional market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions and thereby necessitates lower-powered compensation. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we document evidence that pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reduced market frictions. Firm investment also becomes more sensitive to stock prices during the experiment, consistent with increased managerial learning from the market.