Relational Contracts and Smallholder Farmers’ Entry, Stay and Exit, in Kenyan Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Export Value Chain
研究肯尼亚新鲜果蔬出口价值链中，小农如何通过关系合同中的供应可靠性机制实现进入和停留，并发现小农会根据风险偶尔退出和重新进入价值链。
Buyer-driven governance systems and the related value chain entry and stay barriers are known to have led to smallholder farmers exiting the Kenyan fresh fruits and vegetables export value chain. This paper addresses two gaps in this literature. First, the paper addresses the question of how the fresh fruits and vegetable export smallholder farmers have managed to secure their stay in this value chain known for its high entry barriers. Second, the paper addresses the question of what happens to the smallholders known to have exited the value chain. To explore the two gaps, transaction costs theory was applied. The results show that smallholders entry and stay in the value chain was underpinned by relational contract enforcement mechanism of supply reliability. Second, smallholders were found to occasionally exit and re-enter the value chain, depending on the prevailing risks. In conclusion, the paper argues that contemporary African value chain scholarship should consider the analysis of relational contracts and their enforcement mechanism as well as the totality of smallholders’ farming, in order to understand the motives behind smallholder value chain entry and stay decisions.