Wage Compression within the Firm: Evidence from an Indexation Scheme
研究了意大利工资指数化机制如何压缩企业内部工资分布，发现该机制导致技能工人向技能密集型企业流动，并迫使低技能企业退出市场。
Abstract We revisit the role of labour market institutions by showing how they affect the sharing of firm-specific rents between employers and employees. We look at an Italian wage indexation mechanism (‘Scala Mobile’) that compressed the distribution of wages, imposing real wage increases at the bottom of the distribution. After developing a simplified version of a search model with intra-firm bargaining and on-the-job search, we document that skilled workers received lower wage adjustments when employed at firms with many unskilled workers and they tended to move towards more skill-intensive firms. Moreover, the system drove the least skill-intensive firms out of the market.