Tournament incentives and firm credit risk: Evidence from credit default swap referenced firms
研究了企业内部高管锦标赛激励对信用风险的影响，发现其通过缓解投资不足问题降低信用风险，尤其在内部治理强或产品市场竞争激烈时效果更显著。
Abstract In this paper, we evaluate the impact of managerial tournament incentives on firm credit risk in credit default swap (CDS) referenced firms. We find that intra‐firm tournament incentives are negatively related to credit risk. Our results suggest that tournament incentives reduce credit risk by alleviating the potential for underinvestment when managers are concerned about exacting empty creditors. Further, we find that tournament incentives decrease credit risk when internal governance is strong or product market competition is intense. Taken together, our results suggest that creditors perceive senior manager tournament incentives (SMTI) as a critical determinant of a firm's credit risk, particularly in settings where managerial risk aversion is high.