Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice
实验检验了代际建议如何影响学校匹配机制的表现，发现即使激励兼容的机制，通过社会学习获得的经验也可能不会促进真实报告偏好。
Abstract While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning.