Preemption contests between groups
研究群体间的先发制人博弈，发现成本最低的企业会采取行动但存在延迟，竞争加剧和成本收益比降低会减少延迟，大群体中企业等待更久但群体行动可能更早。
Abstract We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the probability of a low‐cost firm is higher. Asymmetries in group size or strength of externalities also matter.