博弈中的说谎与欺骗

Lying and Deception in Games

Journal of Political Economy · 2019
被引 81
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

在策略互动情境下定义了说谎、欺骗和损害,指出说谎依赖信息的公认含义但不需考虑受众反应,欺骗则需考虑受众解读但不直接涉及后果,损害需考虑信息后果,并给出欺骗必然造成损害的条件。

Abstract

This article proposes definitions of lying, deception, and damage in strategic settings. Lying depends on the existence of accepted meanings for messages but does not require a model of how the audience responds to messages. Deception does require a model of how the audience interprets messages but does not directly refer to consequences. Damage requires consideration of the consequences of messages. Lies need not be deceptive. Deception does not require lying. Lying and deception are compatible with equilibrium. I give conditions under which deception must be damaging.

说谎欺骗博弈均衡