Merger Negotiations with Stock Market Feedback
研究了目标公司股价在收购要约前的上涨是否增加了收购方的成本，通过模型检验发现股价上涨反映了理性预期，而非导致收购方重复支付预期协同效应的成本反馈循环。
ABSTRACT Do preoffer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs? We present model‐based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about potential takeover synergies. Rational deal anticipation implies a relation between target runups and markups (offer value minus runup) that is greater than minus one‐for‐one and inherently nonlinear. If merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer with the runup—a costly feedback loop where bidders pay twice for anticipated target synergies—markups become strictly increasing in runups. Large‐sample tests support rational deal anticipation in runups while rejecting the costly feedback loop.