Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers
研究消费者向多产品卖家披露信息时，隐私对福利和价格的影响，发现卖家承诺不利用信息定价可促进披露，但消费者反而受损，且总剩余可能降低。
I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multiproduct seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. Although the consumer benefits from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to commit to not use information for pricing in order to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the consumer, who could be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, total surplus may be lower if the seller can base prices on information.