SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN LARGE NETWORKS: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
研究了大型网络博弈中社会互动的估计问题，所有观测来自单一均衡，提出了基于网络距离衰减依赖的统计推断方法，并应用于大学入学决策分析。
Abstract This article studies estimation of social interactions in a large network game, where all observations come from one single equilibrium of a network game with asymmetric information. Simple assumptions about the structure are made to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium strategies satisfy a network decaying dependence condition requiring that dependence between two players' decisions decay with their network distance, which serves as the basis for my statistical inference. Moreover, I establish identification and propose a computationally feasible and efficient estimation method, which is illustrated by an empirical application of college attendance.