Cash holdings in family firms: CEO identity and implications for firm value
研究发现家族企业比非家族企业多持有相当于总资产2.3%的现金，这一现象主要由继承人CEO驱动；继承人CEO的现金政策导致企业价值损失，每额外一欧元现金的边际价值平均折价38.3欧分。
Abstract We investigate the cash holdings policy of family firms and examine potential value implications. Family firms hold more cash than other firms, with an average difference of 2.3% of total assets. This result is driven by firms managed by heir CEOs. While the cash holdings policy of first‐generation family firms is more sensitive to firm risk, consistent with founders’ increased risk aversion, that of later‐generation firms is more sensitive to information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Heir CEOs’ cash policies destroy value, as the marginal value of an additional Euro suffers from a 38.3‐cent discount, on average, relative to non‐family firms.