Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
研究了在完全信息下，不依赖期望效用或拟线性偏好，仅通过事后可验证性和小转移，就能用迭代占优唯一精确实施任何社会选择函数，对机制设计理论有重要贡献。
This study investigates implementation of a social choice function with complete information, where we impose various restrictions such as boundedness, permission of only small transfers, and uniqueness of iterative dominance in strict terms. We assume that the state is ex-post verifiable after the determination of allocation. We show that with three or more players, any social choice function is uniquely and exactly implementable in iterative dominance. Importantly, this study does not assume either expected utility or quasi-linearity, even if we utilize the stochastic method of mechanism design explored by Abreu and Matsushima (Econometrica 60:993–1008, 1992a; Econometrica 60:1439–1442, 1992b; J Econ Theory 64(1):1–19, 1994). We further show that even with incomplete information, and even with two players, any ex-post incentive compatible social choice function is uniquely and exactly implementable in iterative dominance.