Motivated monitoring by institutional investors and firm investment efficiency
研究发现机构投资者的主动监督能缓解企业投资低效问题，包括过度投资自由现金流和因经理人职业担忧导致的投资不足，且监督效果随企业在机构投资组合中的相对重要性单调递增。
Abstract We find that motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm investment inefficiency, estimated by Richardson's (2006) approach. This relation is robust when using the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes as exogenous shocks to institutional ownership during the period 1995–2015 and after classifying institutional ownership by institution type. We also show that closer monitoring mitigates the problem of both over‐investing free cash flows and under‐investment due to managers’ career concerns. Finally, we document that the effectiveness of the monitoring by institutional investors appears to increase monotonically with respect to the firm's relative importance in their portfolios.