Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis
为聚合博弈构建了产业组织分析工具，推导了短期和长期非对称寡头的比较静态结果，并揭示了长期中多种市场结构的强中性性质，对并购、私有化等研究有参考价值。
Abstract We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long‐run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market structures. The results elucidate aggregative games as a unifying principle in the literature on merger analysis, privatization, Stackelberg leadership, and cost shocks.