A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods
提出一种用于慈善或公共资助的机制，通过平方投票法扩展，实现去中心化公共物品生态系统的近似最优供给，并讨论其在竞选融资等领域的应用。
We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from quadratic voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Citizens make contributions to public goods of value to them. The amount received by the public good is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the “standard model,” this mechanism yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion, and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance and highlight directions for future analysis and experimentation. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.