Credit and Punishment: Are Corporate Bankers Disciplined for Risk-Taking?
研究公司银行家是否因发放不良贷款而面临离职等惩戒后果，发现信贷事件会增加银行家离职率，并促使他们未来采取更严格的风险管理措施。
Abstract We examine whether bankers face disciplining consequences for structuring poorly performing corporate loans. We construct a novel data set containing the employment histories and loan portfolios of a large sample of corporate bankers and find that corporate credit events (i.e., downgrades, defaults, bankruptcies) increase banker turnover. The effect is pronounced when bankers issue loans with loose terms or experience severe losses. Credit events prompt bankers to adopt stricter future risk management practices, such as offering restrictive covenant packages. Overall, our findings are consistent with banks disciplining employees as a means to manage their own risk exposure.