Matching With Complementary Contracts
研究了存在互补性的匹配环境（如社交媒体平台或专利许可市场）中稳定结果的存在性，适用于不可转移和可转移效用，并给出了算法和比较静态分析。
In this paper, we show that stable outcomes exist in matching environments with complementarities, such as social media platforms or markets for patent licenses. Our results apply to both nontransferable and transferable utility settings, and allow for multilateral agreements and those with externalities. In particular, we show that stable outcomes in these settings are characterized by the largest fixed point of a monotone operator, and so can be found using an algorithm; in the nontransferable utility case, this is a one‐sided deferred acceptance algorithm, rather than a Gale–Shapley algorithm. We also give a monotone comparative statics result as well as a comparative static on the effect of bundling contracts together. These illustrate the impact of design decisions, such as increased privacy protections on social media, or the use of antitrust law to disallow patent pools, on stable outcomes.