经济学与“坏”管理:表演性的局限

Economics and ‘bad’ management: the limits to performativity

Cambridge Journal of Economics · 2019
被引 9
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

质疑管理学界对主流经济学理论(如代理理论、交易成本经济学)导致“坏”管理的批评,认为这些理论更多是纵容而非创造“坏”管理,其根源在于资本主义所有权关系,改善管理需要商学院内外的更广泛改革。

Abstract

Abstract The performative power of mainstream economic theories (notably agency theory and transaction cost economics) has been criticised by researchers within management studies. The latter blame these theories for creating ‘bad’ management in real-world organisations and call for their removal from business schools. This paper questions this line of criticism. It argues that mainstream economic theories have condoned more than created ‘bad’ management. It also questions whether ‘bad’ management can be negated by ousting these theories from business schools. Rather it is argued that ‘bad’ management has deep roots within organisations—specifically, it reflects on how organisations are run by and in the interests of capital owners. The possibilities for securing comparatively enlightened or ‘good’ forms of management are seen as necessarily limited by capitalist ownership relations. The paper argues that the transformation of management will require wider reforms in—and importantly beyond—business schools.

表演性主流经济学代理理论交易成本经济学