Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
通过一项网络形成实验，检验短视和远视稳定性概念的表现，发现短视概念能准确识别最稳定网络，但远视概念（尤其是悲观假设下）能识别短视概念无法识别的稳定网络。
We test the performance of myopic and farsighted stability concepts in a network formation experiment with a stream of payoffs and relatively unstructured link formation process. A subtle treatment variation demonstrates clearly the power of myopic stability concepts in precisely identifying the set of the most stable networks. However, we also find support for the predictions of farsighted concepts of stability, especially those that assume players’ pessimism about the eventual outcome of a deviation. This is the first study to demonstrate that there exist environments where farsighted stability concepts identify empirically stable networks that are not identified by myopic concepts. Thus, myopic stability concepts are not necessarily sufficient to predict all stable outcomes in empirical applications.