The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Dual-Class Voting Premium
利用萨班斯-奥克斯利法案（SOX）作为自然实验，研究发现SOX显著降低了美国双重股权公司的投票溢价，并改善了投资效率、现金管理和CEO薪酬，表明SOX有效遏制了私人控制收益。
We examine the impact of corporate governance laws on the private benefits of control, using the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a natural quasi experiment. We find a large decline in the average voting premium of US dual-class firms targeted by major SOX provisions that enhance boards’ independence, improve internal controls, and increase litigation risks. The targeted firms also improve the efficiency of investment, cash management, and chief executive officers’ compensation relative to firms not targeted by SOX. Overall, the evidence suggests that SOX is effective in curbing the private benefits of control.