Pledgeability, Industry Liquidity, and Financing Cycles
研究了企业为何在预期高估值时选择高债务但随后表现不佳，提出融资周期理论，认为债权人控制现金流权利（可抵押性）随行业流动性变化，高预期流动性导致高债务并削弱激励，产生长期负面影响。
ABSTRACT Why do firms choose high debt when they anticipate high valuations, and underperform subsequently? We propose a theory of financing cycles where the importance of creditors’ control rights over cash flows (“pledgeability”) varies with industry liquidity. The market allows firms take on more debt when they anticipate higher future liquidity. However, both high anticipated liquidity and the resulting high debt limit their incentives to enhance pledgeability. This has prolonged adverse effects in a downturn. Because these effects are hard to contract upon, higher anticipated liquidity can also reduce a firm's current access to finance.