Communication with forgetful liars
研究了多轮廉价沟通中，知情方在撒谎后忘记谎言内容的情形，刻画了均衡特征，并解释了何时能几乎必然获取全部真相、何时会出现多重谎言，以及为何刑事调查中会使用复杂的沟通协议。
I consider multiround cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why nontrivial communication protocols are used in criminal investigations.