Words Speak Louder without Actions
研究委托代理模型中，委托人干预代理人决策的权力如何削弱其有效沟通私人信息的能力，并指出低干预成本或严重代理问题会损害委托人利益，适用于管理领导、董事会、私募股权和股东积极主义。
ABSTRACT Information and control rights are central aspects of leadership, management, and corporate governance. This paper studies a principal‐agent model that features both communication and intervention as alternative means to exert influence. The main result shows that a principal's power to intervene in an agent's decision limits the ability of the principal to effectively communicate her private information. The perverse effect of intervention on communication can harm the principal, especially when the cost of intervention is low or the underlying agency problem is severe. These novel results are applied to managerial leadership, corporate boards, private equity, and shareholder activism.