The Effect of Joint Auditor Pair Composition on Audit Quality: Evidence from Impairment Tests
利用法国强制要求两家审计师的法律环境，研究发现由一家四大和一家非四大组成的审计配对比两家四大配对更能促进商誉减值确认和披露，对投资者和监管者评估联合审计制度有参考价值。
Abstract Using a sample of firms from France, where the law requires the use of two auditors, we study the effect of auditor pair composition on audit quality by examining a specific account, goodwill impairment. We document that firms audited by a Big 4–non‐Big 4 auditor pair ( BS ) are more likely to book an impairment and book a larger impairment than firms audited by a Big 4–Big 4 auditor pair ( BB ) when low‐performance indicators suggest a greater likelihood of impairment. Moreover, firms audited by a BB pair reduce impairment disclosures when they book impairments, while firms audited by a BS pair do not, suggesting lower transparency for firms audited by a BB pair. Our results inform investors and firms in mandatory joint audit regimes, as well as regulators who are considering requiring joint audits.