Information exchange in cartels
研究企业间交换成本、价格或销售信息如何影响合谋，发现公开总销售数据能实现近乎完美的合谋，即使无法识别降价企业。
Abstract Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible.