Intertemporal price discrimination with two products
研究一个能承诺动态定价策略的垄断卖家如何通过跨期价格歧视实现利润最大化，发现当消费者估值非强排序时，提供完整捆绑或延迟组件供应可优于混合捆绑。
Abstract We study the two‐product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly ordered, then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations, we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling. So we show that the established no‐discrimination‐across‐time result does not extend to two‐product sellers under standard taste distributions.