SME investment and financing under asymmetric information
研究了信息不对称下资金受限的中小企业投资时机与融资决策，发现好企业为区分自身会加速投资导致扭曲，而股权担保互换可缓解融资约束并减少扭曲。
Abstract We investigate the investment timing and financing decisions of financially constrained small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in a real‐option setting with asymmetric information. ‘Bad’ firms can sell over‐priced securities by mimicking in a pooling equilibrium. However, ‘good’ firms can separate from bad firms by imposing an adverse selection cost for mimicry only when the benefit of being recognized as the ‘good’ type outweighs the investment distortion costs. Further, asymmetric information induces good firms to accelerate investment, leading to investment distortion and higher guarantee costs. Equity‐for‐guarantee swap not only mitigates SMEs' financing constraints but also reduces the investment and finance distortions.