Can One Stone Kill Two Birds? Political Relationship Building and Partner Acquisition in New Ventures
研究新创企业建设政治关系对获取供应商和买家的相反影响：政治关系通过信号效应增强合法性，但供应商偏好而买家可能回避，基于中国337家新创企业调查数据。
We extend the resource dependence theory to argue for the opposing effects of political relationship building on new ventures’ abilities to obtain suppliers and buyers. By signaling endorsement and better access to resources, political connection enhances new ventures’ legitimacy and bargaining position. In supply chains featuring high contractual uncertainties, suppliers favor new ventures with higher certainty of payment but buyers can be deterred by new ventures more difficult to control. Hence, paradoxically, political relationship building can exert opposing effects on a new venture’s acquisition of suppliers and buyers. We found empirical support through a survey of 337 new ventures in China.