Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
研究了委托人无法承诺不进行再谈判时，如何设计防再谈判机制。代理人类型仅影响委托人效用，委托人可利用与类型相关的公开信号进行不完全验证。最优机制导致顶端混同，即高于阈值的类型报告为最大类型，低于阈值的类型如实报告。
I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type affects only the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, that can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation‐proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation‐proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types above a certain threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully.