Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy
证明，Sönmez和Sönmez-Switzer的学员兵种匹配机制可视为凯尔索-克劳福德经济中的降薪调整过程，其中学员具有可替代性，服务合同长度充当反向薪资。
Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sönmez and Sönmez-Switzer.