Trustee affiliation and servicer oversight: Evidence from CMBS markets
研究了受托人与服务商之间的关联关系如何影响CMBS市场中的监督行为，发现关联关系导致对违约贷款过度垫付本金和利息，损害债券持有人利益，并增加损失率。
Abstract We study the effect of a change in trustees' incentives to monitor servicers in CMBS markets. Our identification strategy rests on variation in servicer–trustee affiliation that arises from mergers. We present evidence that affiliation is associated with excessive principal and interest advances on delinquent loans that are not in the interest of bondholders. We observe that a servicer–trustee affiliation affects the waterfall cash flows of senior, mezzanine, and junior bond‐tranches. Additionally, we find that affiliation increases the loss rate by $0.05 or $0.07 per dollar of outstanding debt and estimate an economic impact of $5.5 billion in market‐wide liquidation losses.