Experience of Communal Conflicts and Intergroup Lending
利用印度银行的管理者与借款人配对数据，发现经历过宗教暴力的印度教支行经理对穆斯林借款人放贷更少，且这些贷款违约率更低，表明冲突加剧了基于偏好的歧视，且这种偏见持续存在。
We provide microeconomic evidence on ethnic frictions and market efficiency, using dyadic data on managers and borrowers from a large Indian bank. We conjecture that, if exposure to religion-based communal violence intensifies intergroup animosity, riot exposure will lead to lending decisions that are more sensitive to a borrower’s religion. We find that riot-exposed Hindu branch managers lend relatively less to Muslim borrowers and that these loans are less likely to default, consistent with riot exposure exacerbating taste-based discrimination. This bias is persistent across a bank officer’s tenure, suggesting that the economic costs of ethnic conflict are long-lasting, potentially spanning across generations. © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.