Short Sellers and Long‐Run Management Forecasts
利用随机放松卖空限制的自然实验，发现卖空威胁促使管理层增加长期好消息预测，以阻止卖空者，且该效应在预测质量高、公司价值不确定性大或经理股权激励强时更显著。
ABSTRACT We examine how short sellers affect long‐run management forecasts using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short‐selling constraints on a group of randomly selected firms (referred to as pilot firms). We find that compared to other firms, the pilot firms issue more long‐run good news forecasts but do not change the frequency of long‐run bad news forecasts. The increase in good news forecasts is greater when the pilot firms have higher‐quality forecasts, greater uncertainty about firm value, or higher manager equity incentives. Overall, these results and the results of additional analyses indicate that the reduction in short‐selling constraints and the increase in short‐selling threat induce managers to enhance disclosures through more long‐run good news forecasts to discourage short sellers.