CREDIT, DEFAULT, AND OPTIMAL HEALTH INSURANCE
研究了违约选项如何影响最优健康保险政策，发现战略违约使最优医疗补助收入门槛从平均收入的25%提高到44%，对政策制定者有参考价值。
Abstract I study how credit and default affect optimal health insurance, constructing a life‐cycle model of health investment with a strategic default option on emergency room bills and financial debts. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and used to compare the optimal policy for Medicaid by the availability of the default option and credit. I find that strategic default induces the optimal policy to be more redistributive. With (Without) the option, the optimal income threshold for Medicaid eligibility is 44% (25%) of the average income. In these findings, the interaction between strategic default and preventative medical spending is important.