Employer Screening and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
基于德国数据的结构模型，研究雇主对长期失业者的筛选如何影响最优失业保险设计，发现筛选使最优初始福利提高4个百分点、福利期限延长7个月。
Abstract Field experiments show that employers are less likely to consider long-term unemployed job seekers for interviews. We study the implications for optimal unemployment insurance. Based on a structural model of job search and recruitment, estimated with German data, we analyse the optimal two-tier unemployment system. We find that screening makes the optimal initial benefit level 4 percentage points higher and the potential benefit duration seven months longer. Using an extended Baily–Chetty formula, we study the mechanisms through which screening affects the consumption smoothing gain and moral hazard cost of providing unemployment insurance and highlight the role of the externality from endogenous firm behaviour.