Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios
利用欧洲央行储备货币组合数据，发现资金经理在无明确金钱奖励的情况下，仍会因相对排名调整投资风险，且个人职业关注和机构同伴压力共同驱动这一行为。
Abstract Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.